By Amah Alphonsus Amaonye | AWC Security & Policy Desk
Amid Nigeria’s intensifying security crisis, the establishment of the US–Nigeria Joint Working Group (JWG) has resurfaced as a beacon of hope. With top officials named to the panel, Abuja and Washington are signalling seriousness about deepening their cooperation on counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and capacity building.
Below is a refreshed analysis that adds the personal dimension — the men and women now charged with steering the collaboration — and revisits what this could realistically mean for Nigeria’s security outlook.
Who’s on the Nigerian Side of the JWG
According to the official State House release, President Tinubu approved the following appointments to represent Nigeria:
| Position / Role | Name |
|---|---|
| Chair (Head of Nigerian Delegation) | Nuhu Ribadu — National Security Adviser (NSA) |
| Minister of Foreign Affairs | Yusuf Maitama Tuggar |
| Minister of Defence | Mohammed Badaru Abubakar |
| Minister of Interior | Olubunmi Tunji-Ojo |
| Minister of Humanitarian Affairs | Bernard M. Doro |
| Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) | Olufemi Oluyede |
| Director-General, National Intelligence Agency (NIA) | Mohammed Mohammed |
| Inspector-General of Police (IGP) | Kayode Egbetokun |
| Secretariat Staff | Ms. Idayat Hassan (Office of NSA), Mr. Paul Alabi (Embassy of Nigeria, US) |
With this lineup, the JWG represents the core of Nigeria’s security, intelligence, foreign policy, humanitarian and defence leadership — reflecting the multi-dimensional nature of the challenges ahead.
What the Inclusion of Top Officials Means for the JWG’s Credibility
Having senior leaders from key ministries and agencies at the table gives the JWG both political weight and operational reach. It means:
- Policy coordination won’t be hindered by turf wars — foreign affairs, interior, defence and humanitarian functions are all represented.
- Intelligence and enforcement capacity — through NIA, the military (CDS), and the Police (IGP) — ensures that cooperation can move beyond planning into action.
- Flexibility for humanitarian and civilian-protection needs, via the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, recognizing that insecurity isn’t purely a military issue.
- Strong leadership and continuity, since the NSA chairs the group, ensuring alignment with national security strategy.
In short: the JWG isn’t some loose advisory board. It’s a high-powered, cross-sector working committee — if it works as structured, the potential is real.
What the JWG Can Deliver — And What It Cannot
What It Can :
- Rapid intelligence sharing, especially real-time tactical data from U.S. sources — crucial for forest operations, insurgency tracking, and pre-empting large-scale attacks.
- Procurement support for defence equipment, including possible access to U.S. excess defence articles and faster approvals for aircraft, surveillance gear, and technology transfer.
- Capacity building and training for Nigeria’s security and intelligence agencies — law enforcement, border control, special forces, forensic units — to raise professional standards.
- Strategic coordination across ministries, blending security action with humanitarian response and governance reforms, which is critical for sustainable peace in volatile zones.
What It Cannot:
- Replace Nigeria’s structural governance deficits — corruption, local policing failures, judicial delays, community-state distrust. Foreign aid cannot rebuild trust or fix institutions alone.
- Solve root causes of insecurity — poverty, land disputes, ethnic tensions, climate change, resource competition — unless matched by robust domestic reforms.
- Guarantee long-term equipment upkeep, training, or institutional transformation if aftercare is weak. External support may dry up or be politicized.
- Overcome political and bureaucratic inertia at the state level; many security threats in Nigeria are local and outside federal purview.
What Nigeria Must Do to Maximise the JWG’s Impact
Given the stakes, Nigeria should:
- Establish transparent oversight — a parliamentary-civil society committee to monitor JWG operations, report progress, and guard against external overreach.
- Link cooperation to deliverables — require periodic audits of intelligence operations, human-rights compliance, and community protection outcomes.
- Integrate JWG plans with domestic reforms — revamp border control, strengthen civil policing, accelerate judiciary reform, deepen community-based security initiatives.
- Ensure capacity building — not dependency — focus on training, maintenance, local production of spare parts, rather than one-off hardware supplies.
- Promote local-ownership messaging — publicly frame the JWG as partnership, not intervention, reinforcing national sovereignty while leveraging global support.
Final Word: A Strategic Gamble — But One With Potential
The inclusion of Nigeria’s most senior security and policy officials in the JWG gives the initiative a serious shot at reshaping the fight against insecurity. If managed well, coordinated smartly, and accompanied by genuine reforms, this partnership could become a turning point — a real chance to rebuild Nigeria’s security architecture.
But it’s a strategic gamble. If at any point the alliance is either hijacked by narrow interests — or allowed to mask persistent structural failures — then the JWG will collapse under its own contradictions, leaving Nigeria no safer than before.
For now, the names are in place. The tools may come. But the difference between a breakthrough and a breakdown will depend on willpower, oversight, and national resolve.
— AWC Security & Policy Desk
